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Introduction 
 
In this contribution, we shall try to characterise the Russian growth model the way it appears 
to have emerged in the 2000s, which we believe useful to explain the country’s 
macroeconomic successes at an earlier stage as well as the severe problems it has to face now. 
The reasons for the choice of the subject are multiple. First of all, whilst numerous analyses 
have recently sought to understand and appreciate the impact of the crisis, its transmission 
channels as well as the economic prospects of various nations, the non-OCDE world has not 
received so much attention. This is somewhat surprising given that the majority of the post-
crisis scenarios tend to ascribe the leading role to pull the world economy out of the deadly 
depressive spiral to the so-called BRIC countries. Among the BRICs, Russia appears to be hit 
most of all and it is important to understand how and why. Furthermore, the recognition of 
important differences among institutional set-ups in capitalist economies led to the emergence 
of an extremely interesting literature on the “varieties of capitalism” in the 1990s and 2000s. 
But this literature has also mainly dealt with the OCDE countries. Our ambition is to pursue 
this analysis and shed some more light on the salient characteristics of the specific post-Soviet 
rent-seeking “exportist” capitalism that gradually emerged in Russia in the 2000s.  
 
We shall begin by presenting the macroeconomic indicators of the Russian Federation 
between the 1998 crash and up to the recent 2008 crisis, showing their very significant 
improvements in practically every area (part 1). However, the qualitative aspects of the 
economic growth suggest asking whether one the main reasons of Russia’s economic success 
(high commodity prices) did not make it seriously sick with the “Dutch disease” (part 2). We 
shall further show that the impressive growth before the 2008 crisis was followed by a yet 
more impressive shock hitting the economy to the extent that very few analysts had imagined 
(part 3). We believe that the propagation of the crisis was amplified by the specific features of 
the capitalist system that emerged in Russia in the 2000s, particularly its “international 
regime” (part 4). We conclude our contribution by saying that the Russian model in the 2000 
appeared to be intrinsically unstable before suggesting possible scenarios of finding paths to a 
sustainable growth model.        
1. Rebound and Boom: Russian comeback in the early 
2000s 
 
The main macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy since 1999 and until the recent 
global economic meltdown are quite impressive. The record would look even more 
spectacular against the backdrop of the economic and social catastrophe the country went 
through in the 1990s.  
 
Between 2000 and 2008, Russia’s GDP grow at an average annual rate of 7% in real terms 
(Figure 1). After having nearly halved between 1991 and 1998, it fully recovered its 1991 
level by 2007, which made Russia the world’s 6th or 7th large economy sorted by purchasing 
power parity, according to different sources1.     
  
The investment dynamics during this period – although arguably insufficient given the needs 
to modernise the economy – is positive as well. The investment recovers considerably after 
                                                 
1
 According to the IMF data, Russia’s GDP in PPP was the 6th in terms of size in 2008. The World Bank and CIA 
estimates place Russia 7th, after Great Britain.    
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the 1998 financial crash and grows in nominal and relative terms at a steady pace in the 2000s 
reaching 22.3% of the GDP in the second quarter of 2007.    
 
                             Figure 1: Russia’s GDP growth between 1991 and 2008 
 
                                 Source: IMF, www.imf.org 
 
Finally, substantial increases in real wages and very reasonable unemployment rates have an 
undeniably strong positive effect on the living conditions of the Russian population. The 
annual increase in real wages during Putin’s presidential terms is about 10%, hitting the 
highest of 16% in 2007. As a result of this continuous progression, real wages nearly double 
between 1999 and 2007. Again, the contrast is stark when these data are compared to the 
general impoverishment of the Russians in the nineties. At the same time, the unemployment 
rate glided down progressively from more than 12% in 1999 to less than 7% in 2006 (Figure 
2).  
Figure 2: Real Wages and Unemployment in Russia before the 2008 crisis 
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Sources: Goskomstat, EBRD. 
 
These enviable macroeconomic indicators of the Putin era have been most often explained by 
skyrocketing commodity prices during the same period. Although this factor was - beyond 
any reasonable doubt - extremely important, linking Russia’s macroeconomic performance to 
the rise of commodity prices alone would be a simplification. The developments in the 
Russian economy since the 1998 financial crisis suggest that the high rates of economic 
growth the country enjoyed since 1999 were not based on exactly the same factors and 
policies. We think it useful to distinguish between at least two periods in the recent economic 
history of Russia since the 1998 crash. The first one runs from the end of 1998 until 
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approximately 2003, when the Russian industry benefited primarily from the stimulating 
effects of the ruble devaluation. The second one starts in 2003-2004, when economic growth 
becomes driven primarily by high commodity prices and redistribution of export windfalls. It 
is also during this second period - corresponding roughly to Mr. Putin’s second presidential 
term - that the State gets much more actively involved into the economy and the policies of 
the Russian government become much more “interventional”. 
 
1.1. 1998-2002: reaping the benefits of the ruble devaluation  
The 1998 financial crash results in an extremely strong devaluation of the national currency. 
The speed with which the seemingly moribund industrial sector manages to respond to this 
devaluation is quite remarkable. The growth of industrial output in Russia is already 
observable in the last quarter of 1998 (Figure 3), i.e. in the aftermath of the financial crash. 
This might appear astounding and perfectly counterintuitive but the reason of this reactivity is 
the peculiar form of adjustments of the Russian firms to the economic conditions of the 
nineties. Non only are they completely disconnected from the predatory financial sector 
(which explains why its crash has no effect on the industry), but they also tend to keep their 
workforce and collective competencies available despite the ever-shrinking demand, instead 
of laying-off their workers and/or closing down the sites as orthodox models would suppose 
them to [Petrovski, 2004]. The ruble devaluation makes locally manufactured goods 
competitive inducing significant import substitution, which turns out to be immediate: the 
only thing Russian firms have to do is to increase their capacity utilisation and ship goods to 
market. Capacity utilisation rate of the Russian enterprises goes up from about 50% before the 
crisis to nearly 70% two years later (RECEP, 1998-2003). Higher rates of capacity utilisation 
contribute, in turn, to productivity growth and improvement of competitiveness, thus creating 
a “virtuous circle”.     
 
Figure 3: Industrial output in Russia after the 1998 economic crisis  
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Source: RECEP, Russian Economic Trends, 1999-2003. 
 
Strong growth of industrial output in Russia continues at a steady pace to reach 120% of its 
1997 level by mid-2002. Even more interesting is the sectoral dynamics, with the fastest 
growth during this period occurring in chemicals, machine-building, wood, paper and wood 
products, and food industry.  
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The period running from 1999 to 2003 is also characterised by a set of policies that differ 
considerably from what will follow later. President Putin himself described at the time his 
political agenda as that of ‘pragmatic liberalism’. The reforms of his first presidential term 
appear to confirm this statement: a new Tax Code simplifying and reducing taxes on the 
business and the rich, a reformed Labour Code authorising easier lay-offs to make labour 
market more flexible, rather orthodox macroeconomic policies. 
1.2. 2003-2008: commodities boom and “Golden Years” 
However, as Figure 4 shows, the competitive advantage derived from the ruble devaluation in 
1998 tends to vanish progressively by 2003-2004, with industry competitiveness index2 going 
down sharply as the ruble real exchange rate goes up. This corresponds to the period when the 
prices of commodities that Russia exports (hydrocarbons as well as ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, in the first place) start reaching extremely high levels. In this respect, it is important to 
emphasise that while oil prices double in 2000 as compared to 1999, they actually fall 
between 2000 and 2002. It is only in 2004 that they really start skyrocketing.  
 
Figure 4: Real exchange rate and industry competitiveness 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development and Trade [2008], presentation of the director of the 
department of macroeconomic analysis A. Klepach. 
 
By 2003-2004, ruble appreciation combined with soaring commodity prices change the 
macroeconomic landscape to a considerable extent. The economic growth continues to be 
strong but it is no longer based on a favourable exchange rate and import substitution, but on 
extremely high commodity prices (hydrocarbons and metals) as well as on the redistribution 
of export windfalls.       
 
Moreover, precisely during this period, the economic policy of the Russian government takes 
a nationalistic ‘developmentalist’ turn, which resembles the post-war trajectories of certain 
Asian and European countries [Durand, Petrovski, 2008]. This is reflected for example in 
significant extension of public property, sometimes by using fiscal and environmental 
                                                 
2
 This is a UNIDO index based on two sets of components, namely industrial development indicators and 
competitive industrial performance. 
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pressures and leaving no choice to the owners of the assets concerned, but also by acting 
through state-owned companies that buy (entirely or partially) formerly private businesses. In 
addition, no serious analyst would fail to notice the deployment of various industrial policy 
instruments or the fact that Russian investment abroad is being actively encouraged and 
supported by the government. Ostensibly, the objective of this voluntarism is to preserve the 
autonomy of the Russian economy and to use the rent from the export of natural resources to 
modernise the largely obsolete industrial base.  
2. Is Russia a victim of the “resource curse”? 
 
The drivers of the Russian economic growth in the 2000s, the apparent importance of 
hydrocarbon exports as well as the political evolution of Russia during the same period 
brought to the forefront the hypothesis of the “resource curse”. The main questions seem to 
be: does Russia suffer from it at all? If this is the case, how badly does it? How can these 
negative effects be mitigated? What are adequate policy responses to the problem?   
2.1.  An economy heavily based on natural resources 
In order to understand the existing structure of the Russian economy, one has to deal first with 
certain difficulties related to the data. The official statistics, while technically correct, paint a 
somewhat distorted picture, because a significant share of the value added generated by the oil 
and gas sector in Russia is not taken into account due to the prevalence of transfer pricing 
[Kuboniwa et al., 2005 ; World Bank 2004 a and b ; Gurvich, 2004, Ellman, 2006]3. Indeed, 
according to the data compiled by Goskomstat, extraction industries account for less than 
10% of GDP in 2008 (Figure 5), and about 18% of industrial output in 2004 (the latest data 
available, Figure 6). 
Figures 5 and 6: The structure of the Russian GDP and of the industrial production 
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The structure of the industrial production in 2004
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 Source: Goskomstat.  
So, at first sight, the ‘resource curse’ does not appear to be an issue. However, exports of oil, 
oil products and natural gas alone represent 18.5% of GDP, which raises the question of their 
coherence with the former figure. Adjusted data suggest that in reality, the contribution of oil 
and gas to the Russian GDP is 24.1% in 2000 and 20.5 % in 2001 as against 7.8% and 6.7 % 
respectively, according to the official statistics [Kuboniwa et al., 2005]. According to the 
World Bank, about 49% of industrial added value comes from the hydrocarbons against 29% 
in the official statistics [2004 a and b]. Whilst it is true that these estimates are not very recent, 
                                                 
3
 This point is summarised in C. Ruehl and M. Schaffer, ‘Potemkin's GDP’, Wall Street Journal, February 19 
2004. http://go.worldbank.org/LGWSRQDNF0  
  7 
there is no serious reason to believe that the measurement of the contribution of the 
hydrocarbons to the Russian economy, has considerably improved ever since. 
The problem of the dependence of Russia on natural resources is better understood when 
looking at the international specialisation of the country. A rapid comparative outlook (Figure 
74) shows that despite its size, Russia is strongly dependent on foreign trade. The average 
Trade/GDP ratio is 54.2% between 2005 and 2007, with exports being heavily dominated by 
hydrocarbons (72.5 % of the total exports in 2007).  
     Figure 7: Comparative trade profiles 
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   Source:  WTO trade profiles, 2009 
The picture would be even more impressive if one takes into account all the exports that 
depend, in one way or another, on natural resources. These include: i) all the products directly 
related to energy (such as oil products, coal and electricity); ii) ferrous metals because the 
steel industry benefits considerably from the availability of local minerals, coal and cheap 
energy; iii) non-ferrous metals whose competitiveness relies heavily on the available local 
minerals (nickel and gold) and/or cheap Siberian hydro-electrical energy (aluminium); iiii) 
chemicals that are derived from natural gas (such as fertilizers). In this case, the conclusion 
will be that nearly 90% of exports are somehow resource based (Figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The sample has been compiled so as to show the position of Russia as compared to various trade profiles of big 
and medium sized countries: the BRICS, exporters of natural resources, exporters of manufacturing goods, 
developed economies, transition economies.   
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 Figure 8: The Structure of the Russian Exports 
Structure of the Russian Exports in 2008
Chemicals
3% Other
3%
Energy
78%
Machine-
Building
5%
Metals
11%
 
Source: Russian Customs, Eco-Win, 2008. 
2.2. “Resource curse”, negative lock-in, and the problem of 
persistent dependency 
The dependency perspective focuses on the reproduction of asymmetrical relations between 
core and peripheral countries in the capitalist world. Furtado [1972, 1997] argues that under-
development is a sub-product of the industrial revolution: modern consumption patterns 
spread rapidly worldwide whist new production technologies that induce these consumption 
patterns are mainly concentrated in the most advanced economies. The result of this 
asymmetry between consumption habits and the localisation of production capacities is that 
less developed economies are locked in a state of dependency.  
The “Russian resource curse” hypothesis, which has received a growing attention in recent 
years in the West [Aslund, 2005; Desai, 2006] and in Russia [Smirnov, Arbatov, 2004; Guriev, 
Sonin, 2008] may be seen as a peculiar form of this process. Modernisation and dependency 
co-exist, since consumption patterns can be funded by export windfalls whilst the 
development of high added value sectors may remain weak. Numerous empirical studies 
suggest that countries generously endowed with natural resources tend to be underdeveloped 
and enjoy slower rates of GDP growth [Karl, 1997; Papyrakis, Gerlagh, 2004; Sachs, Warner 
1995; Pessoa, 2008], even after adjusting the results to fluctuations in commodity prices 
[Sachs, Warner, 2001].  
In spite of this strong evidence, the “resource curse” is not inevitable. Resource-based 
development can also be a powerful driver to modernise the economy, as it was, for example, 
in the US in the nineteenth century. This appears all the more true if one considers various 
lines of theoretical arguments found in the literature in support of this thesis, suggesting the 
existence of significant room for manoeuvre to pursue adequate policies and mitigate adverse 
effects of the “resource cruse” [Ahrend, 2006].  
Potential vulnerability in case of external shocks is the most obvious problem. As abundant 
empirical evidence suggests, crises in emerging markets are most often caused by severe 
shocks arising from sharp falls of prices of the country’s main export commodities. 
Obviously, economies dependent on exports of natural resources are particularly exposed to 
this risk [Narain et al, 2003]. 
A second range of arguments is based on the hypothesis that “easy riches lead to sloth”. In a 
nutshell, the abundance of natural resources suppresses the need to compete internationally in 
manufacturing sectors (and in some cases, in agriculture), which leads to the persistence of 
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specific institutional weaknesses. Auty [1994] distinguishes four aspects of the phenomenon : 
“the richer the natural resource endowment then, first the longer lax macro policies are 
tolerated; second, the less pressure to achieve rapid industrial maturation; third, the longer 
rent-seeking groups are tolerated (and the more entrenched they become); and fourth, the 
greater the likelihood of decelerating and more erratic economic growth”.  
Following the “Dutch Disease” approach, the “resource curse” can also be linked to the 
“crowding out” effect that the expansion of commodity exports has on the development of 
manufacturing sectors [Ellman, 1977; Grégory, 1976; Corden, 1981 and 1984; Corden, Neary, 
1982; Van Winjbergen, 1984; Sid Ahmed, 1987; Sachs, Warner, 2001]. The main point here is 
not the negative effects on investment and employment in the short and medium term but 
rather the long-run negative impact of such an international specialisation on manufactured 
tradables.  
In fact, manufacturing sectors tend to be more competitive and innovative as compared to 
other sectors and are characterised by technological spill-overs [Krugman, 1987]. As 
comparative advantage evolves over time through learning-by-doing, The “Dutch Disease” 
may well lead to a negative lock-in resulting in persistently lower productivity and GDP 
growth rates. In low and middle income countries, a weaker exchange rate can off-set two 
kinds of disadvantages that affect local production of tradables much more than that of non-
tradables [Rodrick, 2008]. The first one stems from institutional weaknesses and more radical 
contract incompleteness in these countries. The second one is related to market failures that 
hinder structural reforms and economic diversification. Consequently, an undervalued 
exchange rate fosters the growth of tradables and, as a second best solution, accelerates 
structural change and learning processes. Conversely, an overvalued exchange rate acts as a 
tax on local production of tradables. It impedes growth i) by reducing incentives to invest in 
tradable goods since local production loses competitiveness [Prasad et al, 2007] ; ii) but also, 
indirectly, by making the country miss opportunities to improve its institutions and pursue 
more efficient policies that could have emerged along with the development of manufacturing 
sectors. 
2.3. How seriously is Russia sick with the “Dutch Disease”? 
There have been several recent studies addressing the issue of ‘Dutch Disease’ in Russia. At 
the macro level, Desai’s estimate [2006] suggests that continuing ruble appreciation seems to 
have some negative effect on the manufacturing sector between 1999 and 2004 but the result 
is statistically non-significant. Ollus and Barisitz [2007] conducted an analysis of the Russian 
imports from 25 countries of the European Union and found more convincing evidence of the 
phenomenon. Their study shows that in clothing industry but - more importantly - in 
machinery and equipment, imports grow faster than does the domestic production. The trend 
is the same in chemicals, plastics, paper, publishing and wood products. Not surprisingly, 
imports do not appear to threaten domestic production in mineral extraction and metallurgy. 
This is not the case in the food industry either, but this sector benefits from one of the highest 
levels of trade protection in Russia. More unexpected is the fact that in the area of electric, 
electronic and optical equipment, Russian firms seem to resist well to foreign competition. Of 
course, the interpretation of these results is subject to some caution: for example, the rise of 
imports in machinery and equipment may be related to the modernisation of obsolete 
industrial capacities through investment. However, the overall picture appears to confirm the 
thesis of incipient des-industrialisation.    
A recent IMF working paper [Oomes and Kalcheva, 2007] finds that Russia has all the 
symptoms of the “Dutch Disease”, that include: i) real exchange rate appreciation, ii) slower 
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manufacturing growth, iii) fast development of the service sector, iiii) high growth of wages. 
However, the authors’ conclusion is that the diagnosis of the “Dutch Disease” in Russia is yet 
to be confirmed. In particular, they point out that slower growth in the manufacturing sector 
as compared to the service and resources sector may be a “natural transition phenomenon”, 
given that the manufacturing sector was overdeveloped during the Soviet period whilst the 
service sector was underdeveloped. In addition, they argue that some des-industrialisation in 
relative terms may also have been “natural” given the growth of real wages: as households get 
richer, their demand tends to shift away from goods to services.  
An OECD study [Ahrend, de Rosa and Tompson, 2007] gives a more nuanced appreciation of 
the recent macroeconomic dynamics in Russia. The authors compare Russia and Ukraine, 
trying to neutralise the contribution of natural resources over the period between 1997 and 
2005. Their study shows that Russia’s manufacturing sector had been completely destroyed in 
comparison to Ukraine’s. In addition, productivity remains significantly higher in Russia, 
even if productivity growth had been faster in Ukraine. The authors put forward several 
explanations but the main factors appear to be the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
the relative protection of the Russian industry from foreign competition. This allowed Russian 
manufacturers to increase their prices above international levels, in particular for non-
tradables. Securing higher prices for their products permitted Russian industrial enterprises to 
pay larger wage bills. Thus, relative protection against foreign competition mitigated the 
crowding-out effect and limited further negative consequences of the “Dutch Disease” in 
Russia. 
However, this optimistic analysis is somehow contradicted by the evolution of Russia’s 
foreign trade. There is a loss of competitiveness of the Russian manufactured tradables in 
terms of unit labour costs as well as in terms of added value. Between 1997 and 2004, Russia 
enjoyed growing revealed comparative advantages (RCA) in hydrocarbons (oil, oil products 
and gas), wood, pulp and paper, as well as energy intensive products, such as non-ferrous 
metals, fertilizers, and steel. At the same time, Russia's comparative disadvantages grew 
worse in industrial machinery and equipment, electronic consumer goods, car manufacturing 
and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. By and large, as living standards rose, Russia 
imported more goods than it was importing in the mid-nineties. At best, this would indicate 
that the sectors manufacturing these goods were either non-existent at the start of the 
transition or had virtually disappeared by 1996-97.  
Figure 9: Relative Structure of the Russian GDP 
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Source: Goskomstat, 2009 
A somewhat provocative interpretation of these results is also possible. While limiting 
competition, rent-seeking could have acted as a partial antidote against the devastating effects 
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of the “Dutch Disease” on the Russian industry. The developments during the most recent 
period, when oil prices skyrocketed, could give some credit to such a hypothesis. Due to the 
aforementioned methodological problems, it is difficult to put a clear diagnosis regarding the 
“Dutch Disease” on the basis of the aggregate sectoral data available (Figure 9).  
But it is obvious that the growth rate of the key non-tradables is substantially above that of the 
output (Figure 10). Moreover, as we have seen earlier, Russian real wages rose substantially 
in 2000s, whilst CPI increased considerably as well, even if these developments might not be 
related exclusively to high hydrocarbon export revenues (Figure 11). Such symptoms appear 
to support the diagnosis of the “Dutch disease”.  
Figures 10 and 11: Activity index for key non-tradables and Inflation and export revenues 
from hydrocarbons 
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Sources: Goskomstat, CBR, Eco-Win. 
 
At the same time, the growth rates of some manufacturing industries are quite surprising. 
High-tech manufactured goods and machinery are among the fastest growing, while oil, 
mining, basic metals and chemicals are growing at a much slower pace. The only sector where 
a clear trend towards des-industrialisation is noticeable is textile. The manufacturing sector 
pursued a rapid growth in comparison with oil sector and non-tradables. This occurred despite 
higher wages and substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the country’s 
international trade profile has been deteriorating with growing specialisation in energy 
products and basic manufacturing on the one hand and increasing dependency on 
manufactured goods, particularly in automotive industry but also in high-tech products, such 
as computers and telecommunications, on the other hand (Tables 1 and 2).  
Table 1 and 2: Russia’s Revealed Comparative Advantages in 2001 and 2007 expressed in 
thousandths of GDP  
2001
Strong points Weak points
Crude oil 59,853 Cars -8,1665
Non-ferrous metals 22,608 Specialised machinery -7,7529
Natural gas 21,803 Computers & accessories -7,3649
Oil based products 18,365 Pharmaceuticals -7,2739
Other 14,929 Telecom equipment -7,2596
Steel 8,5063 Other agricultural products -7,0719
Fertilizers 3,7819 Sugar -6,0225
Basic chemicals 2,9784 Leather -5,8097
Coal 2,8811 Plastics -5,6907
Edible agricultural products 2,603 Meat & Fish -5,3025
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2007
Strong points Weak points
Crude oil 56,291 Cars -21,349
Natural gas 35,451 Computers & accessories -8,399
Oil based products 22,853 Telecom equipment -7,7514
Non-ferrous metals 10,791 Specialised machinery -7,438
Steel 5,5422 Other agricultural products -6,1573
Edible agricultural products 4,7636 Utility vehicles -5,5102
Coal 4,1702 Plastics -5,3988
Other 4,1374 Hardware -4,9602
Fertilizers 3,875 Leather -4,8122
Basic chemicals 2,906 Electric equipment -4,761
 
Source: CEPII - Chelem estimates, 2009 
Moreover, Russia has persistently negative revealed comparative disadvantages in most 
consumer goods. All this suggests an increased dependence of Russia on foreign countries. 
This dependence is defined here as discrepancy between consumption patterns and production 
patterns: to simplify somewhat, increasing imports have been funded by increasing exports of 
natural resources. 
In summary, Russian economy before the recent crisis is characterised by a small high added-
value manufacturing sector outside of the basic manufacturing industries whose 
competitiveness is strongly dependent on natural resources. Russia’s terms of trade suggest 
that the specialisation of the country as an exporter of primary goods has even worsened 
during the recent period while its dependence on imported manufacturing goods has 
increased. This evolution, along with the strong dynamism in non-tradables, such 
construction, financial services and domestic trade, is clearly symptomatic of the ‘Dutch 
Disease’. In this context, the resilience of domestic manufacturing output seems an anomaly. 
Our tentative hypothesis is that this could be related to somewhat restricted competition on 
the internal market due to tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and also the first consequences 
of the emerging industrial policy5. It also suggests that so-called rent-seeking strategies and 
the embeddedness of manufacturing activities in private-public networks may have protected 
Russian firms from the most ruinous effects of the ‘Dutch Disease’ resulting in total 
destruction of industrial capabilities. This is a crucial point since the literature suggests that 
the preservation of the national industrial base is a key element for long-run development 
prospects. 
3. 2008-2009: a new major economic crisis 
Just like after the 1998 economic and financial crash, the evolution of the Russian economy in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis has been somewhat counterintuitive. This time however, the 
surprises have turned out to be very unpleasant. The strong macroeconomic fundamentals 
seemed to indicate that the Russian economy was robust to face extremely adverse conditions. 
First of all, Russia’s growth rates were high and driven to a large extent by internal demand 
(household consumption, in particular). In addition, financial sector was relatively weakly 
developed, which might be seen as a disadvantage in normal conditions but appeared rather as 
a risk-reducing factor given the nature of the global financial crisis. Furthermore, the 
country’s foreign reserves before the crisis were the world’s third largest, whilst Russia’s 
public debt was very low. And to crown it all, the country continued to run significant 
budgetary and trade surpluses and had accumulated significant “Stabilisation Fund”.        
                                                 
5
 For example, machine-building industries could benefit from oil and gas industry orders placed to support 
them. At the same time, centralising ship-building and aerospace industries under public control could have a 
positive effect on the output of their Russian subcontractors [Durand, Petrovski, 2009]. 
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3.1. A brief comparative outlook 
Despite all this, not only the impact of the crisis was particularly violent but Russia seems to 
be impacted - for the time being at least – more than the vast majority of countries. The recent 
OECD projections say that Russia is to go through a deeper recession in 2009 than most 
developed and emerging nations.  
  Figure 12: OCDE projections of GDP growth in 2009 
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In addition, Russia’s economic downturn contrasts unpleasantly not only with China’s and 
India’s continuing dynamism, but also with the Middle East oil-monarchies whose growth 
should remain positive in 2009, according to the World Bank’s recent estimates [IMF, 2009]7.  
The OECD projections are not the worst-case scenario. The latest World Bank assessment 
paints an even bleaker picture with possible 7.9% GDP contraction in 2009. Suffice it to say 
that the real GDP contraction in Russia in the first quarter was 9.8% [Goskomstat, 2009] and 
the prospects for the rest of year look very uncertain despite the current rise of commodity 
prices, particularly hydrocarbons, since April and May economic data were again highly 
negative.  
Dramatic as it appears however, the Russian economic slump is not an exceptional 
phenomenon in terms of magnitude. But instead of the OECD, BRICs or oil-producing 
countries, one has to look in the post-Soviet family to find similar and even more spectacular 
orders of GDP contraction. For example, Ukraine’s GPD is expected to shrink by 12 to 14% 
in 2009, while Lithuania’s output should be down by 13% and Latvia’s by 19%.    
3.2. Stylized facts at the sectoral level   
First of all, let us look at the sectors that are behind this impressive output contraction in 
Russia before turning to the qualitative explanations and the transmission channels of the 
global economic crisis.  
As Table 3 illustrates, all sectors report negative dynamics in the first quarter of 2009. The 
tradables shrink strongly (-14.4%) as a result of deteriorating external environment and 
consumer confidence. The contraction is the most dramatic in manufacturing (-23.5%) 
                                                 
6
 We are thankful to Geoff Barnard from OCDE for having communicated us the most recent OECD estimates. 
7
 IMF, May 10th 2009, Middle East and North Africa Department. 
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reflecting the weak domestic demand and particularly radical cuts in enterprise investments. 
Extraction industries and agriculture, while going down as well, stay at quite reasonable 
levels, given the general context. The damage also appears less pronounced in non-tradables 
(-6.2%), where the contraction is very severe only in construction (-20.9%), with trade, 
transport & communication and utilities resisting much better.  
 Table 3: GDP dynamics in Russia by sector 
 
Sources: The World Bank, June 2009 
The most recent statistical data indicate that the decline in tradables has been worsening in the 
second quarter of 2009, with growth rates of -25.1% and -23.7% in April and May 
respectively on year-to-year basis. The contraction in manufacturing between January and 
April 2009 is 22% as compared to the same period of the previous year. The most serious 
declines are reported in electro-optical equipment (-42%), transport and transportation 
equipment (-36.4%) and machinery (-34.3%). In certain industries, the contraction is simply 
staggering: car production between January and May 2009 is only 38% compared to the same 
period of 2008, the output of trucks stands at 29% whilst excavating equipment is reported at 
just at 12% of its 2008 level [Goskomstat, June 2009].      
3.3. Causal mechanisms of crisis development in Russia  
The question is obviously why the deterioration of the Russian economy has been so 
spectacular while Russia’s fundamentals appeared to suggest that it was sufficiently robust 
and – in any case – much netter equipped to face the crisis than many other countries. In our 
view, three main factors should be emphasised: drastic fall of commodity prices, imported 
credit crunch, and impressive capital flight. These factors seem to have been aggravated by an 
inadequately tight monetary policy.  
 
The first transmission mechanism is obvious and is imposing itself: a significant part of the 
shock came from the drastically falling commodity prices on which the country remains 
highly dependent. This would confirm the common wisdom that Russia is nothing more than 
a “colossus on hydrocarbon legs” to which one should probably add a couple of crouches 
made of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. There is no need to resort to econometric regressions 
to affirm that there is a seemingly strong link between oil prices and the Russian industrial 
production (Figure 13). 
 
Peaking at 147 US dollars per barrel, the oil price went under 37 dollars at its lowest in 
December, which made the proceeds from exports of crude oil and diesel fuel fall by 42% in 
the last quarter of 2008 as compared to the third quarter. At the same time, steel prices went 
down considerably and the slumping demand on foreign markets - on which Russian steel 
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manufacturers are particularly dependent8 - resulted in the contraction of the sectoral output of 
more than 44% in the last quarter 2008. Although it did go up somewhat in April and May, it 
still recorded a 29% drop between January and May 2009 on year-to-year basis. Despite 
RusAl’s serious financial problems, the output of non-ferrous metals appears less affected, 
even if aluminium export revenues declined by about 9% with comparable rates of output 
contraction (-8%).  
Figure 13: Manufacturing in Russia versus oil price 
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Source: Coface, Yves Zlotowski’s presentation, May 2009 
 
However, it is not so much about what happened to the exporters themselves but rather about 
their structuring role in the Russian economy. The falling commodity prices do not only affect 
commodity producers, they hit badly all the companies dependent, in one way or another, on 
oil, gas and metal mastodons’ activity and investments. It is worth noting the Russian oil 
industry does not seem to suffer that much. According to the most recent statistics, oil 
extraction and transformation between January and May 2009 remained, roughly speaking, at 
their 2008 levels. Although natural gas output contraction was much more significant (-20% 
between January and May), Gazprom still has considerable resources and strong support of 
the public authorities to face the current crisis. The problem is what happens to the resources 
generated by hydrocarbon exports and recycled in the Russian economy. In the context of 
global financial crisis, oil companies, Gazprom, steel and non-ferrous metals manufacturers 
were desperately looking for cash, which made them seek to improve their working capital 
figures, as well as to reduce dramatically their investment programmes. All this led to record 
declines in the output of investment goods manufacturers.   
 
This brings us to the second crucial mechanism of transmission of the global crisis in Russia, 
which is the particularly acute credit crunch imported from the international financial markets 
starting October 2008. Contrary to what happened in 1998, the problem did not come from 
the public but from the private debt this time. Just like their Western counterparts, Russian 
banks and businesses were involved in the process of “financial optimisation”, which, in the 
context of a huge bubble, suggested the idea of “returning cash to the shareholder” through 
either dividends or share purchase programmes and borrowing heavily cheap money on 
international markets. Financial optimisation efforts might not have been the only reason, 
since endemic insecurity of property rights, ruble appreciation, as well as restrictive monetary 
policy of the Russian authorities whose priority was to curb inflation, might have also 
                                                 
8
 Severstal and Novolipetsk steelworks had more than 50% of their output exported in 2008 [Sapir, 2009].  
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encouraged banks and enterprises to look for funds abroad [Sapir, 2009]. As Figure 14 
demonstrates, whilst the public debt is going down progressively since the beginning of the 
2000s, the private debt is, on the contrary, exploding and reaching 500 billion USD by 
September 2008. 
Figure 14: Russian public and private debt  
government
enterprises
banks
 
Coface, Yves Zlotowski’s presentation, May 2009 
 
As the movement of panic, falling oil prices and catastrophic expectations after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers started producing their disastrous effects on liquidity, Russian 
enterprises and banks, badly needing refinancing, could not find any. And their refinancing 
needs were considerable: orderly payments for the last quarter 2008 alone were estimated at 
72 USD billion [World Bank, 2009]. The doubts about the health of the financial system led to 
the virtual freeze on the Russian interbank market in the last quarter of 2008 stopping de facto 
any lending activity. This is when big export enterprises started desperately looking for cash 
by reducing their stocks, delaying the payment of their bills, slashing their investments and 
output, some of them finding themselves on the verge of bankruptcy9.  
 
The third transmission channel is directly related to the previous one. The generalised panic 
made international investors massively desert Russia. This is reflected in the impressive 
capital outflow of 130 USD billion during the last quarter of 2008. The movement continued, 
at a lesser magnitude, in the beginning of 2009 (Table 4). This capital flight put 
extraordinarily strong pressure on the national currency and contributed to the stock-market 
crash, more important in Russia than in the rest of the world, leading to further ruble 
depreciation, still more negative expectations and so on.  
 
Table 4: Net Capital Flows in Russia in USD billions 
 
Source: World Bank, June 2009.  
 
                                                 
9
 The situation was particularly dire for the aluminium producer RusAl that had to find 7.4 USD billion to pay its 
international creditors. RusAl was one of the first big Russian companies to benefit from VneshEcokomBank’s 
(VEB) loan of 4.5 USD billion. « Русал получил отсрочку по уплате долга в 7,4 миллиарда долларов » 
(RusAl has managed to postpone the payment of its 7.4 billion dollar debt), the 6th of March 2009,  
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2009/03/06/rusal/ 
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The capital flight was an important factor contributing to the virtual freeze of credit in Russia, 
be it to enterprises or to households. In this respect, one should note that the expansion of 
credit to households observed since 2005 was very rapid and quite spectacular. Whilst 
Russian households were still far from having the same debt/revenue ratios as compared to 
their Western counterparts, the expansion of credit was becoming an important driver of 
domestic demand, notably for cars and homes. Its virtual stoppage by the end of 2008 was 
certainly among the reasons behind the enormous declines of output reported by car industry 
(although negative expectations and inventory minimisation cannot be neglected either) and 
construction.   
 
Finally, these factors seem to have been aggravated by an inadequately tight monetary policy 
of the Central Bank pursued from the beginning of the crisis. At the moment when nearly all 
central banks were seeking to ease credit conditions for the financial sector by reducing their 
interest rates, the Russian monetary authorities raised theirs from 11% to 13%. Obviously, the 
objective was to stabilise ruble, curb inflation and stop capital flight. While the efficiency of 
these measures is open to doubt, they undeniably contributed to the virtually total freeze of 
credit to real sector and had a clearly depressing effect on activity [Sapir, 2009].     
 
This tight monetary policy, which was somewhat softened in the end of April, appears to be at 
odds with the ambitious budgetary stimulus programme announced by the Putin government. 
As Sapir [2009] argues, there is an apparent contradiction between the highly restrictive 
monetary policy epitomised by the recently announced intention to withdraw 850 RR billion 
(25 USD billion) from circulation in May-June 2009, and the ambitious budgetary stimulus 
programme pouring 1.6 RR trillion (47.5 billion USD) into the economy, with 60% of this 
package scheduled to be spent before July10.  
 
Figure 15: Budgetary stimulus effort by country in 2009 (as announced in March 2009) 
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Source: Sapir, 2009, CEMI-EHESS 
 
To the budgetary stimulus proper, one should add the generous assistance package offered to 
the troubled financial sector to avoid its collapse and provide liquidity to banks11. All this puts 
                                                 
10
 It is clear today however that this has not been the case. 
11
 The efficiency of the measures to ease credit conditions (preferential loans, public guarantees offered for 
loans, partial compensation to enterprises of the interest paid etc.) leaves to be desired, which is proved by a new 
25% contraction of credit to real sector in May reported by Goskomstat. On the 25th of June, when speaking 
publicly during a governmental meeting, Mr. Putin basically ordered that banks make loans to the real sector. 
“I’m addressing myself to banks with public shareholding… I believe that given [recent] governmental 
decisions, the credit portfolio should be increased by 150 billion rubles in June, plus 150 billion more by the 1st 
of September, which makes it 300. By the 1st of October, the increase should be between 400 and 500 billion… 
Before you put things on the rails for this to happen, I ask you to forget about your summer vacations”. N. 
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the total anti-crisis effort of the Russian government at a quite considerable level as compared 
to the majority of the OECD and BRIC countries (Figure 15).  
 
But despite the ambitious interventionist stance of the Russian government, analysts are quite 
sceptical about these measures yielding a significant contribution in terms of growth. The 
current estimates show that the impact of the public expenditure in 2009 should remain 
limited (Figure 16). Of course, it will depend upon several factors hard to predict at this stage, 
among which the efficiency and speed of the implementation of public programmes, their 
positive multiplying effect on various sectors and, of course, the level of commodity prices in 
the coming months with its determining impact on the domestic demand and investor 
confidence.  
 
Figure 16: Contribution to the Russian economic growth   
Investment
Household consumption Public expenditure
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Source: Coface, presentation, May 2009 
 
Another extremely important factor to take into account is the consumption of households. 
Whilst it has been one of the main drivers of growth in recent years, the current situation on 
the labour market can affect it in a highly negative way.       
3.4. Unemployment: severe adjustments and come-back of some 
1990s practices   
The dramatic declines in output reported in the first quarter of 2009 have induced sharp 
adjustments on the Russian labour market. The unemployment rate jumped to 10% (ILO 
definition) by the end of March, which is 2.2% more than three month earlier and nearly the 
double of the May 2008 figure (5.4%) (Figure17). The slight improvement registered in May 
is ascribable to seasonal factors [Goskomstat, June 2009]. 
Although the economic situation in Russia exercises strong pressure on real wages, their 
reduction has remained - for the time being at least - rather limited (-2%). However, a 
significant increase in wage arrears starting the end of 2008 should be noted. Although wage 
arrears fell slightly in March-April, preliminary numbers in May indicate a new rise 
[Goskomstat, June 2009]. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bianova, “Банкиры проведут отпуск на портфелях” (Bankers to spend their vacations on portfolios), the 26th 
of June 2009, http://www.gazeta.ru/financial/2009/06/29/3216698.shtml 
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Figure 17: Unemployment rate in Russia 
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   Source: World Bank, Goskomstat, June 2009.  
While their absolute volume remains limited (stock of 8.8 RR billion or 284 USD million), 
they might become an important issue in some mono-industrial towns, sometime sparkling 
social unrest (World Bank, 2009)12. The comeback of this practice, which appeared just 
several months ago as an unfortunate atavism of the 1990s, is a curious phenomenon 
illustrating the dire liquidity situation in which many Russian enterprises found themselves.    
The loss of employment in Russia 2009 projected by the World Bank (Figure 18) shows the 
strongest destruction in relative terms is to occur in construction and “other” sectors. It is 
worth noting that unemployment generated by manufacturing, while remaining high in 
absolute terms, does not reflect the magnitude of the output contraction in relative terms. As 
we have seen before, manufacturing is likely to contract by 22-25% in the first half of 2009 as 
compared to the same period of 2008 while its loss of employment should increase by just 
8,5%. A tentative explanation of this phenomenon is attempted in the next section.   
Figure 18: Projected loss of employment in Russia in 2009  
 
   Source: World Bank, June 2009.  
 
                                                 
12
 The recent social unrest in the town of Pikalyovo, when Prime Minister Putin had to intervene directly to 
settle the conflict, was triggered partially by the problem of wage arrears.  “В.Путин потребовал погасить все 
долги перед рабочими Пикалево” (V. Putin demanded that all debts to Pikaliovo workers be paid), the 5th of 
June 2009, http://top.rbc.ru/society/04/06/2009/308033.shtml 
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4. Russian post-soviet “exportist” capitalism 
 
The previous developments bring us to the last section where we try to characterise the 
Russian post-Soviet capitalism in a more systematic way. In our view, there appears to be 
some coherence between the Russian development trajectory in the 2000s and the way the 
country in affected by the current global financial and economic crisis in 2008 and 2009. The 
factors that contributed to Russia’s relative success before turn out to be its main weaknesses 
in the present context.  
4.1. Enlarging the “Variety of Capitalism” approach 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a rather extensive literature on “the varieties of capitalism” 
has emerged and steadily grown. Albert [1991], Crouch and Streeck [1996], Hall and Soskice 
[2001] to mention just a few, have emphasised persistent and important differences – not to 
say divergences – in crucial institutional arrangements between what can be roughly termed 
“Anglo-Saxon” and  “European continental/Japanese” models13. Amable [2005] goes further 
and proposes a multi-dimensional approach, less centred on the business firm, which results 
in a taxonomy of five stylised types of modern capitalism.  
 
However, the general trend observable in this literature is to focus primarily on the OECD 
countries and more specifically on the “Western” countries14. The rest of the world is hardly 
ever explored. One of the main reasons is probably the position of less developed nations in 
the global economy, which makes it hard to carry out analyses with traditional analytical 
tools, particularly without considering the international regime as the centrepiece of the 
economic system heavily affecting all the other institutions and policies. To be fair, abundant 
literature on “developmentalism” has addressed similar issues [Johnson, 1995; Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 1990] but these studies do not seem to have been largely influential in the “varieties of 
capitalism” approach.  
 
Some scholars from the French “Regulation School” (Ecole de Régulation) have attempted to 
understand the success of East-Asian newly industrialised economies in terms of institutional 
variety. For example, Jessop and Sum [2006] point out that such an approach could offer a 
credible alternative to market-centred, state-centred and culturalist explanations of the “Asian 
miracle”. The problem is that early regulationists’ attempts to do so had some apparent 
defects, particularly their pronounced tropism to analyse economic development along the 
lines of the “fordist model” and its success or failure.   
 
But the “newly industrialised” Asian economies are obviously not the only possible target for 
such an analysis. Chavance and Magnin [2006] look into the institutional variety in Central 
and East-European countries to show that despite quite similar initial conditions before the 
“transition to the market economy”, these countries do not form a homogenous group in the 
2000s. While common post-socialist “path-dependent” features, institutional imitation, 
influence of the European Union and international organisations, and globalisation trends 
                                                 
13
 Obviously, the adjectives might differ while making reference to similar phenomena. Albert 
[1991]distinguishes between neo-American (Anglo-Saxon) and neo-corporatist (Rhine model) whilst Hall and 
Soskice [2001]speak of “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies.  
14
 It is revealing that among Amable’s five capitalisms [2005], four types comprise European and other anglo-
saxon countries (US, Canada, Autralia, NZ). The fifth type comprises the developed Asian nations (Asian 
capitalism).   
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have certainly been factors of convergence, there are also very important differences 
springing from specific historical events and endowments, but also from public policies and 
political choices, as well as possible preferences for the model of a particular “developed” 
country. This is not to mention certain original institutional solutions found in an ad hoc way 
during the transition process. However, there are scholars who tend to insist more on the 
similarities among post-socialist countries. Bohle [2006], for example, stresses the dominance 
of trans-national capital and “passive” adaptation of the new EU member-states during the 
transformation process. Noelke and Vliegenthart [2009] have recently suggested the 
emergence of a specific group of Dependent Market Economies (DME) in Eastern and 
Central Europe. Given the dramatic impact of the current economic and financial crisis on 
these economies, the authors appear to have been overly optimistic about the coherence of the 
model and its sustainability. Nevertheless, their diagnosis concerning the centrality of the 
existing hierarchy between foreign headquarters of multinational companies and their 
subsidiaries located in Central and Eastern Europe seems correct. Such a situation induces 
fundamental dependence of these economies on the investment and production decisions 
made by trans-national corporations.  
Given the existence of all this literature, the Russian case looks somewhat paradoxical. Whilst 
the Soviet economy was widely studied as a specific system, post-soviet Russia - despite the 
emergence of certain highly idiosyncratic properties - has hardly retained any attention at all 
as a specific type of capitalism. Of course, no attentive observer could miss the salient 
changes during Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term, but very little conceptual work has 
been done to account for them and to go further than qualifying them as "state capitalism", 
"corporate state" or « strategic turning point »15. These appreciations have most often turned 
out to be mere judgements of value and have not led to any systematic and systemic analysis. 
There have been some exceptions, of course. Speaking of the consolidation of the Russian 
elites, David Lane [2008] suggests that the country has evolved in the direction of a corporate, 
cooperative, state-led capitalism. However, Lane’s analysis focuses on the changes in the 
economic policy and misses many original features of the post-soviet capitalism in Russia. 
Indeed, as Jessop and Sum [2006] argue, state-led approaches assume that the political 
apparatus of the state is a kind of unified bloc, which is able to remain isolated and place itself 
above all the other social and economic agents. In reality, the situation appears to be much 
more nuanced with the key issue being the role of economic and political networks in policy-
making and the 'governmentalization' of the Russian society.   
We believe that the contemporary economic and political system in Russia is the original 
historical result of at least three distinct processes. Firstly, one should take into account the 
specific socio-economic transformation of post-Soviet Russia. Secondly, Russia’s 
international regime has been characterised by its extremely high dependence on the export of 
natural resources, the import of manufactured goods and liberalised capital movements. 
Finally, the persistence of an obsolete but extensive manufacturing base inherited from the 
Soviet times continues to play a crucial role in the socio-economic and geographical 
organisation of the country. We will try to briefly describe and link these factors here by 
focusing on the “growth regime”, the dominant coordination mechanisms and the capital-
labour nexus.  
                                                 
15
 A. Illarionov, « When State Means Business », International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2006; Zlotowski  
[2006] ; J. Sapir [2007] 
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4.2. Weak autonomy of the growth regime based on the export of 
natural resources  
As we have shown before, one of the key characteristics of the Russian economic 
development in the 2000s is its heavy reliance on exports of natural resources and the 
consecutive lack of autonomy. This situation can be characterised as a specific form of 
“exportism” [Jessop and Sum, 2006] making the economy doubly vulnerable. The first source 
of vulnerability comes from the structure of the Russian exports and potential external shocks 
associated with them, in particular due to the volatility of international commodity prices. The 
second one is related to Russia’s place in the international economy and the nature of its 
economic relations with other nations. On the one hand, Russia’s macroeconomic 
performance depends to a considerable extent on its access to global commodities markets, as 
well as tariff and non-tariff rules conditioning this access. In this respect, one should also 
stress the importance of the international financial and commercial networks but also the 
characteristics of globalized value chains, for example for producers of ferrous and non-
ferrous metals. On the other hand, the Russian economy is also heavily dependent on imports 
of high-tech consumption goods and some key capital goods. Against this general backdrop, 
the weakness of the growth regime in terms of development prospects is revealed by the fact 
that investment rates remain rather modest. Although growing strongly until the 2008 crisis16, 
the Russian investment rate still hovered at around 20% of GDP, which is much lower than 
the Indian rates and nearly half of the Chinese (Figure 19).  
Figure 19: Comparative investment levels in BRIC countries  
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  Source: EcoWin, Reuters. 
True, Russian investment rates are comparable to Brazil, but Brazil did not go through a 
dramatic recession the way Russia did in the nineties and does not need to restructure its 
obsolete industrial base in such a profound way. It is also worth noting that investment rates in 
Russia are significantly inferior to the rates of major European nations during their 
‘reconstruction period’ after World War II or those of Asian countries whose model can be 
characterised as ‘developmental’. Even more worrying is the fact that modest as it looks, the 
investment remains concentrated in extractive industries, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
transportation, energy, communications, and construction. The machine-building sector gets 
just 0.5% of the total in 2005 and 2006, which is even less than during 2000-2004 period 
                                                 
16
 Investment increased by 42.6% in 2006 and 26% in 2007, according to Rosstat. The method of making these 
estimates was contested by some analysts but strong investment growth during this period is not subject to any 
doubt.  
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(Goskomstat, 2008).  
The opportunity cost of arbitrating in favour of investment instead of consumption should 
also be taken into account. The point here is that the same monetary amount of investment 
might not have the same opportunity cost. As Gaddy [2007] argues, markets of consumption 
goods are rather competitive in Russia whilst markets of investment goods are pretty much 
closed, which results in a sort of “mark-up” when investing in fixed capital. Consequently, 
spending the same amount on investment in Russia does not yield the same results in 
comparison with a country where the markets concerned are more open. According to Gaddy, 
the Russian investment rate should be halved if the opportunity cost is taken into account. 
 
In parallel, Russian outward direct investment (ODI) has expanded rapidly since the 
beginning of the decade. The country has become the leading direct investor among the 
BRICs (Figure 20). Hydrocarbon companies are clear leaders here, followed by steel and non-
ferrous metal producers [Liuhto, Vahtra, 2007; Skolkovo, 2008; Durand, 2007]. In 
comparative perspective, this recent upsurge in investment abroad can be seen as an anomaly 
by the “Investment development path paradigm” [Kalotay, 2008]. In reality, it should be 
considered as a logical follow-up of Russia’s economic openness during the post-Soviet 
period. In the beginning, the internationalisation of some Russian enterprises was suggested 
by the extremely challenging conditions on the internal market with domestic demand 
collapsing in the nineties. Later on, international expansion was based on different reasons as 
Russian firms tried to secure their access to strategic markets and globalised supply chains. In 
addition, the industrial policy of the Russian State should have played an important role, at 
least in certain cases. The recent acquisition of Opel by the publicly controlled Sberbank 
allied with Magna appears to aim at gaining access to technological and/or management 
know-how.  
Figure 20: Outward direct investment in the BRIC countries  
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  Source: UNCTAD, 2009 
Nonetheless, at the macro level, the unexpectedly high levels of ODI, especially when internal 
investment remains rather modest, seem to support Gaddy's thesis suggesting that Russia 
belongs to “investment constrained economies” [Rodrick, Subramanian, 2008]. The growth 
prospects of such economies are constrained primarily by inadequate investment demand (due 
to low return on investment for public or private agents) but also, as argued earlier, by an 
unfavourable exchange rate.  
 
  24 
In this situation, the liberalisation of financial flows completed by the Russian authorities in 
2006 does not seem to make any sense. At the macroeconomic level, the objective was 
certainly not to attract additional speculative capital flows leading to further ruble 
appreciation, but this is precisely what happened between 2006 and 2008. When the “Dutch 
Disease” is potentially an issue, it appears much more logical to keep at least some control 
over the capital account, barring the entry to speculative short-term capital and reducing the 
vulnerability of the country’s financial system to external shocks that could result from abrupt 
reversal of capital flows [Sapir, 2009].  
4.3. Public/private networks as dominant coordination mode  
The second key characteristic of the Russian capitalism in 2000s is the prevalence of 
public/private networks as the dominant form of economic coordination. To be sure, 
public/private coordination in itself is not a specific feature of Russia. France and Korea 
[Tylecote, Visintin, 2007], but also Italy, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and other countries were 
characterised by similar phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century. The pioneering 
studies by Gerschenkron [1943, 1962] on Germany, Japan and Russia were followed by 
extensive research on the post-war development of Asian nations, such as Japan [Johnson, 
1995], South Korea [Amsden, 1989] or Taiwan [Wade, 1990], to name just a few. In all these 
studies, the authors emphasise an extremely important role of the state in developing national 
industries and “governing the market”, to use Wade’s expression. This meant pursuing clearly 
mercantilist commercial policies by limiting foreign competition on domestic markets and 
creating conditions for the national champions to succeed on international markets.   
The Russian case is quite peculiar and different from the post-war situation in Western Europe 
or Asia. The extension of public/private networking in Russia can be explained by at least 
three idiosyncratic factors.  
First of all, the privatisation process in the 1990s was widely perceived as opaque, unfair and 
disrespectful of basic legal standards, which undermined its legitimacy. The endemic 
weakness of property rights up till now is largely the consequence of this process. The 
extension and consolidation of public ownership – a process that accelerated sharply in 2003-
2004 - marked the beginning of a new phase in the attempts to gain control over the rent. 
Formally, the process was respectful of the international legal standards protecting private 
property. In reality however, the State often recovered control of assets by using 
“administrative” methods, such as fiscal or environmental pressures [Durand, 2008 ; Durand 
and Petrovski, 2008]. At the same time, the emergence of huge publicly controlled 
conglomerates in the energy sector, arms trade and banking was apparently meant to become a 
powerful instrument of the State to pursue an ambitious industrial policy. Although private 
vested interests of high profile officials were most certainly an important factor, another 
seeming objective was to foster and shape industrial restructuring and even to support the 
expansion of national companies abroad. It seems that Russian authorities wanted to use part 
of the rent from natural resources to import technological and management know-how by 
acquiring foreign assets17. Furthermore, corporate governance of big private businesses in 
Russia is characterised by high concentration of ownership. The owners, many of whom are 
the so-called “oligarchs” of the 1990s, managed to keep control of their assets by accepting 
some form of co-decision on strategic issues with high ranking public officials in charge of 
                                                 
17
 This appeared to be the case in 2007 when Russian buyers (reportedly Rosoboronexport) wanted to acquire 
the French semiconductor manufacturer Altis. Malakhov A., « Росборонэкспорт приземлился у Парижа » 
(Rosoboronexport has landed near Paris), Kommersant, 03/09/2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docsid=800766 
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the sectors concerned18 [Sakwa, 2008].  
Secondly, an extensive but largely obsolete industrial base inherited from the Soviet times, 
although shrinking severely during the transition process in the 1990s, continues to remain a 
crucial part of the Russian economy. On the one hand, it plays an important role in the 
extraction of natural resources as well as arms exports, still competitive internationally. On 
the other hand, it delivers various manufactured goods to domestic markets, which is much 
more surprising. The most obvious explanation is that Russia has to deal with a limited 
number of big manufacturing facilities, often located in mono-industrial towns scattered 
around Russia’s huge territory and providing jobs as well as various social services to a 
significant part of the least protected population. Their closure or heavy restructuring could 
thus result in devastating social consequences. Since social stability and economic viability of 
the regions appear to be one of the strategic concerns of the Russian authorities, to which one 
should probably add the occupation of the country’s huge territory, the management of these 
firms cannot take decisions based on economic efficiency alone. The Russian growth model 
requires some mechanisms providing flexibility in order to absorb external shocks and limit 
their damaging consequences. This flexibility is partially achieved through political 
compromises between economic efficiency and social feasibility of certain decisions, making 
it necessary to organise the exchange of information and some co-decision between political 
and business elites at the local and/or national level. When this is not done, the way the 
conflicts are resolved shows that the use of private property in Russia is still subject to some 
rather particular constraints19. 
Thirdly and finally, the importance of hydrocarbons for the Russian economy should be 
appreciated beyond their contribution to the country’s GDP. Suffice it to say that the sector 
accounts for about 50% of the federal budget revenues. Politically motivated decisions over 
the use of the rent are crucial for the survival of a great number of industrial enterprises. In 
particular, Russian enterprises benefit from low energy prices bolstering their 
competitiveness. But support to the national industry can also be provided by constraining 
energy mastodons to place orders with national producers while cheaper and better quality 
products could easily be acquired on export markets. 
To summarise, public/private networks appear as a dominant form of coordination in Russia 
because of (i) the weak legitimacy of the property rights, (ii) the size and the importance of 
the industrial base inherited from the Soviet Union from the social but also strategic point of 
view, (iii) and finally, the possibility to provide support by centralising and redistributing huge 
rents from hydrocarbons. As far as the growth model is concerned, such coordination mode 
may be seen as an “either-too-much-or-not-enough” solution. Indeed, it might be “too much” 
because the investment of the state and publicly controlled companies acts as a desincentive 
                                                 
18
 It is hardly a secret that all the important acquisitions made by formally private companies in Russia have to 
be approved by the Kremlin. This was clearly the case when Severstal wanted to acquire Arcelor. Severstal’s 
CEO Mr. Mordashiov was received by president Putin’s to get the approval (“Мордашову - 20% Арселора” 
(20% of Arcelor to Mordashiov), Vedomosty, 26/05/2006.  
19
 The recent conflict in Pikaliovo is an excellent case in point. When local population protested against wage 
arrears and massive lay-offs blockading motorways in the Leningrad oblast, Prime Minister Putin came to town 
in person accompanied by Mr. Deripaska (the owner of one of the factories), VTB’s CEO Mr. Kostin and several 
high-ranking government officials. Addressing himself to the owners of the factories on the 4th of June 2009, Mr. 
Putin said: “You’ve made thousands of people hostages of your own ambitions, non-professionalism and most 
possibly trivial greed. This is flatly unacceptable.” He further added: “I give you three months. Either you find a 
solution or the problem will be settled without you”. The problem with wage arrears was settled on the same day. 
In addition, VTB granted loans to factories to be able to restart their production. “Путин заставил Дерипаску 
подписать договор в Пикалево” (Putin made Deripaska sign an agreement in Pikaliovo), the 5th of June 2009, 
http://www.rb.ru/topstory/economics/2009/06/05/100507.html 
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for private companies to invest themselves in certain areas. At the same time, it might be “not 
enough” because the authorities seem unable to really constrain or incite private companies to 
invest in areas where the state would like them to. 
4.4. Polarization and “dual labour market" 
Although inequalities were already significant during the Soviet era, the “transition to market” 
in the nineties dramatically accentuated them. During the 2000s, things did not change 
fundamentally and actually grew slightly worse. According to the latest estimates, the Gini 
coefficient in Russia was at the level of 41.5 in September 2008, as against 41.0 in 2006, 39.0 
in 2002 and 29.0 in 199120. The current economic crisis is very unlikely to change this 
situation for the better. Other indicators, although incomplete, tend to confirm the hypothesis 
that the gap between the rich and the poor has at least remained as wide as it was in the 1990s.  
As Bank of Finland reports, the average monthly income in Russia in November 2007 was 
13,700 rubles (€380) with wage income accounting for slightly over two-thirds of total 
income21. During January-September 2007, the top quintile accounted for 47 % of all income, 
while the second quintile enjoyed 23 %. The poorest quintile received just 5 % of all income. 
About half of the Russian population has incomes that are only two-thirds of the average, and 
nearly 13 % of the population lives on less than €100 a month [BOFIT, 2008]. To these high 
social inequalities, one should also add extreme inequalities among regions. According to a 
recent UNDP study [UNDP, 2007], the city of Moscow alone accounts for nearly 20% of the 
Russian GDP and 7% of the population and the average income of its inhabitant is almost 5 
times higher than that of the Republic of Dagestan.  
It should also be noted that public policies during President Putin presidential terms showed 
that the issue of growing inequalities did not rank very high on his priority list. The 2002 
fiscal reform introducing the 13% flat tax illustrated that political authorities were ready to 
accept and even reinforce high levels of inequalities. 
However, Russia is not only a highly polarised society but also an economy where the cost of 
adjustments to external shocks rests mainly on the shoulders of workers. The shock of the 
1998 financial crisis was mainly absorbed by wages whose part in the value-added dropped 
from 52% in 1997 to 39% in 1999 (Figure 21).  
 
It is too early to say whether the same adjustment mechanism has been in place to absorb the 
shock of the 2008 crisis. At first sight, the statement regarding high flexibility of the Russian 
labour market might appear somewhat counter-intuitive. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the rise of unemployment in manufacturing, although very sharp, is still not as sharp 
as the output contraction. To be sure, the specificity of manufacturing is such that output and 
labour adjustments cannot be strictly proportional. The competitiveness of industrial sites is 
based on collective competencies or “routines” [Nelson and Winter, 1982], which - just like 
Lewis Carroll’s Humpty-Dumpty - once destroyed, “cannot be put together again” [Stiglitz, 
1999]. So, one cannot reasonably expect unemployment to grow exactly in line with output 
contraction. However, Russian manufacturing seems to proceed to less radical adjustments as 
compared to “developed market economies”. In the United States for example, a less 
pronounced slump in industrial production was followed by more severe adjustments of the 
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 CIA World Factbook [2009], Rosstat [2009], UN Development Programme Report [2006].  
21
 In addition to wages, Russians get income from such sources as small side businesses, capital earnings and 
various social payments (BOFIT, Weekly report, January 11th, 2008). 
http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/90A161D9-2CAA-4633-84FF-A5B6DCD69A4C/0/w022008.pdf 
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workforce22. 
Figure 21: GDP and the breakdown of the value added 
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Our tentative explanation is that Russian labour market is characterised by persistent dualism 
inherited from the Soviet period. Industrial enterprises continue to shed workers reluctantly, 
especially in mono-industrial towns. This is done only when all the other possible solutions 
(wage arrears, short-time working, holidays, unpaid leaves etc.) have been explored. The 
conclusion is that real unemployment rate in manufacturing in Russia is mostly certainly 
grossly underestimated. Nevertheless, moderate official unemployment should not be taken as 
a proof that enterprises pay for the adjustments, because workers who are formally in 
employment generally do not get paid. The question is obviously: why then would they accept 
such a situation instead of getting unemployment benefits? The fact is that when chances of 
finding another job in the area are close to nil and employment benefits are very low, staying 
in employment formally permits avoiding the “stigma of being jobless”, keeps the opportunity 
to benefit from social protection provided by the company, and increases the chances to 
recover the pay once the economic situation gets better.  
At the same time, new sectors, such as services and construction, whose development in the 
2000s in Russia was particularly strong, tend to be much more reactive in adjusting their 
workforce. This is apparent in the statistics provided Goskomstat, with construction and 
“other sectors” displaying high levels of headcount reduction. These adjustments should be 
encouraged by the fact that the workforce in these new sectors is younger and much more 
flexible whilst the bulk of employment is located in big metropolitan centres where 
possibilities to find a new job are much more abundant. 
Consequently, the flexibility on the Russian labour market is not uniform and the adjustment 
mechanism differs significantly depending on the sector. Internal flexibility mechanisms seem 
much more popular in manufacturing, with employment decreasing moderately and real 
wages diminishing considerably23. In some cases, internal adjustments can get more radical, 
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 According to the most recent statistics, American industrial production fell by 13.4% between May and May 
2009 while industrial employment contracted by 11% between January and May 2009 [Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release, June 2009]. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm 
23
 The evidence on the ground seems to indicate for example that real wages might be reduced up to 30% in 
metallurgy. 
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taking the form of wage arrears or unpaid leaves, for example. In the service and construction 
sectors, adjustments appear to be more “classical”, with companies reducing their workforce 
as demand goes down.  
It is important to emphasize however that in both cases the brunt of the adjustment to the 
economic shock is shifted on the side of the labour. One has to wait for the data regarding the 
value added split between wages and profits to validate this hypothesis but even its stability in 
the present context would mean that the shock is mainly absorbed by wages24.  
 
Table 5: A stylized model of 'post-soviet exportism' 
MODE OF GROWTH 
 
 EXTROVERT 
RESSOURCE 
BASED 
 Heavy reliance on exports makes the system 
vulnerable to external shocks 
 High dependence on imported consumption and 
investment goods from developed and developing 
economies  
 Strong embeddedness of corporations and banks in 
international financial, trade and production networks 
 High levels of Russian Outward Direct Investments   
 Heavy reliance on the rules and institutions of the 
prevailing international regime 
 Rather modest investment levels 
DOMINANT FORM OF COORDINATION 
 
 PUBLIC-
PRIVATE 
NETWORKS 
 Weak property rights dependent on the support of 
political leaders and extensive public property 
 Strong interdependence between big private firms and 
political leaders at the local, regional and national levels  
 Coordination of rent distribution and the absorption of 
external shocks 
CAPITAL LABOR NEXUS 
 
 DUALIST 
FLEXIBILITY 
 Adjustment mainly absorbed by workers: variability of 
value-added sharing as a symptom 
 Intra-firm flexibility within corporatist sectors (export-
oriented industries + mono-industrial towns)  
 Extra-firm flexibility within liberalized sectors (non 
tradables) 
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 Even if the share of real wages in the value-added does not shrink, it will still be a proof of fairly high labour 
flexibility. The stability of wage/profit ratio in the context of contracting output suffices to illustrate that the 
labour market is highly flexible [Askenazy, 2003]. 
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Conclusion 
 
The brief analysis of the main developments in the Russian economy undertaken in this paper, 
has attempted to put emphasis on the peculiarities of the country’s growth model in the 2000s. 
The conclusion to which one is led when analysing this model is that it looks intrinsically 
unstable, which is confirmed by the current crisis. In a way, Russian economy is a hybrid 
path-dependent system shaped by constructivist attempts to transform a centrally-planned 
economy into some sort of ideal “liberal market economy”, which are constantly upset by 
attempts to mitigate the adverse economic and social effects that an “ideal liberal market 
economy” is bound to produce. To this fundamental contradiction, one should add a plethora 
of other factors, such as the pursuit of vested interests by powerful rent-seekers, objective 
geo-strategic interests of the Russian state, perception of potential external threats by the 
elites, as well as profound ideological differences between some key members of the 
government.     
 
All these factors explain the incoherence of certain policies pursued before the crisis (for 
example, treating the “Dutch disease” by sterilizing money whilst simultaneously liberalising 
capital flows, which makes this disease worse), as well as apparently blatant contradictions in 
the recent policy mix to fight the crisis (restrictive monetary policy accompanied by an 
ambitious budgetary policy).    
 
Some analysts and political leaders in Russia say that the current economic crisis illustrates 
clearly the failure of the model that emerged in the 2000s and presents a formidable 
opportunity for a deep change25. This change would imply building a different type of 
capitalism based on the development of innovative and high value-added sectors. Whilst the 
latter suggestion is obviously pretty much consensual, building such a model is easier said 
than done.     
 
And yet, on a more normative note, what could be the solutions to escape from the “resource 
curse”? We believe there are two broad types of strategies that could be explored. The first 
one, for the want of a better term, could be called “competitive Schumpeterian”. Since it is not 
realistic that high value-added sectors, competitive nationally and internationally, can emerge 
in Russia spontaneously, political authorities should assume and pursue more actively their 
“developmentalist” efforts by supporting innovative sectors the way post-war Japan, South 
Korea or Taiwan did. However, such strategies suppose a rather weak national currency on the 
one hand and “leap-frogging” capacity to catch up with the industrial leaders on the other 
hand. Given that Russia is rich in resources and that its exports will continue - beyond any 
reasonable doubt - to exercise a very strong effect on the real exchange rate, the 
macroeconomic policy mix will then have to be completely changed. As for leap-frogging, it 
requires well-educated workforce and a specific “social contract” fostering learning and long-
term commitment. This will also suppose a considerable shift away from the social policies 
that could be observed in Russia in the 2000s.  
 
The second type of strategy can be called “non-competitive anthropogenetic”. The general 
idea is canalise the resources generated by exports in the direction of high value added non-
tradables produced for the needs of the internal market. Their development will take time, but 
once in place, they will be impossible to weed out by foreign competitors. As Boyer [2002] 
puts it, such a strategy is based on the “reproduction of man by man”. It could seek to bolster 
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 S. Shelin, “Путин выбрал депрессию” (Putin has chosen depression), www.gazeta.ru, the 1st of July 2009. 
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the attractiveness of the country and foster its economic dynamism through investment in 
non-tradable services, such as education, health, ecology, but also – possibly - into modern 
high-value added industrial sectors (green energies, biotechnologies etc.).         
      
These two strategies are not necessarily incompatible, but they do present a potential conflict. 
There is a strong temptation to base the “Schumpeterian competitive” strategy on what is 
often called by the Russian authorities “the natural comparative advantage of the Russian 
industry”, i.e. low energy prices. This is clearly not compatible with “anthropogenetic” 
approach where the impetus should be put on modern cutting-edge technologies, often related 
precisely to energy saving and externality reduction.  
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